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Court-Packing Time? Supreme Court 
Legitimacy and Positivity Theory 
STEPHEN M. FELDMAN† 
ABSTRACT 
Many progressives have decided they need to change the 
Supreme Court to break the conservative justices’ lock on 
judicial power. Yet those same progressives disagree about 
the best way to change the Court. This Essay begins by 
comparing straight-forward court-packing—adding justices 
to shift the partisan balance on the Court—to other possible 
Court changes, such as court-curbing measures that would 
reduce the Court’s power. Court-packing has multiple 
advantages over these other possibilities, not the least of 
which is that even the current Roberts Court would almost 
certainly hold court-packing, unlike other potential changes, 
to be constitutional. Even so, some progressives view court-
packing as the most extreme or radical option. They fear that 
court-packing would undermine the Court’s sociological 
legitimacy: public approval and acceptance of the Court’s 
authority and decisions. This Essay therefore delves deeply 
 
†Jerry W. Housel/Carl F. Arnold Distinguished Professor of Law and Adjunct 
Professor of Political Science, University of Wyoming. This Essay is derived in 
part from my forthcoming book: PACK THE COURT! A DEFENSE OF SUPREME COURT 
EXPANSION (forthcoming 2021). I thank the two anonymous reviewers and Greg 
Goelzhauser, all from Temple University Press, for their helpful comments on the 
book manuscript. 
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into a burgeoning area of political science literature on the 
Court’s legitimacy: Positivity theory states that the 
American people embrace the Court with a favorable bias of 
good will. From this perspective, diffuse support for the 
Court as an institution is resilient, even when support for 
specific Court actions wavers. A handful of legal scholars 
have touched on the recent research in this area, but given 
our current political moment and recent Court 
developments, a more comprehensive exploration of this 
complicated literature seems necessary, particularly as it 
bears on the possibility of court-packing. Ultimately, this 
research suggests that court-packing is unlikely to weaken 
the American people’s support for the Court as a judicial 
institution. 
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Many progressives have decided they need to change the 
Supreme Court. For some, the last straw was the Merrick 
Garland debacle. After Justice Antonin Scalia’s death in 
February 2016, President Barack Obama nominated Judge 
Garland (of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia) to fill the seat, but Senate majority 
leader, Republican Mitch McConnell, with the cooperation of 
all eleven Republican members of the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, refused even to open hearings on Garland’s 
possible confirmation.1 For other progressives, the 
subsequent confirmations of Neil Gorsuch and Brett 
Kavanaugh—the Kavanaugh confirmation hearings were 
especially contentious—convinced them that Court change 
was necessary.2 Yet, for other progressives, the Senate 
Republicans’ rushed confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett 
barely a week before election day in 2020 was the definitive 
final step. And still other progressives found that the ongoing 
deep and wide conservatism of the Court’s decisions pushed 
them over the edge, despite Chief Justice Roberts occasional 
feints to the middle.3 
 
 1. Ron Elving, What Happened with Merrick Garland in 2016 and Why it 
Matters Now, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/ 
2018/06/29/624467256/what-happened-with-merrick-garland-in-2016-and-why-
it-matters-now. 
 2. E.g., STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, THE NEW ROBERTS COURT, DONALD TRUMP, 
AND OUR FAILING CONSTITUTION 243–44 (2017) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FAILING] 
(discussing Gorsuch’s conservatism); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING BACK THE 
CONSTITUTION: ACTIVIST JUDGES AND THE NEXT AGE OF AMERICAN LAW 211 (2020) 
(stating that Kavanaugh’s nomination led some Democrats to conclude 
something needed to be done about the Court). 
 3. For a smattering of examples of conservative decisions, see Seila Law LLC 
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2185 (2020) (holding that a for-
cause limitation on the President’s power to remove the Director of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Bureau—CFPB—violated the separation of powers); Rucho 
v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (holding that political 
gerrymandering was a nonjusticiable political question); Town of Greece v. 
Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 570 (2014) (upholding the opening of town board 
meetings with overtly sectarian Christian prayers); Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 570 
U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (invalidating key provision in Voting Rights Act); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (holding that 
restrictions on corporate campaign spending violate free expression); Crawford v. 
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While many progressives now agree that the Court must 
be transformed, these same progressives have not reached a 
consensus as to the appropriate change. This Essay argues 
in favor of one specific approach: straight-forward court-
packing—simply adding justices to shift the partisan balance 
on the Court.4 If the Democrats sweep the November 2020 
elections, gaining control of both houses of Congress and the 
presidency, they should add at least four justices to the 
Court, increasing its size to thirteen. They should then 
nominate and confirm four progressive justices. A 
progressive bloc of seven justices would then control the new 
Roberts Court. If the Democrats do not sweep the 2020 
elections, they should pack the Court whenever they are able 
to do so (assuming that, at some point in the future, they will 
control Congress and the presidency). 
Numerous Democrats, both moderate and more 
progressive, have expressed support for court-packing. In a 
celebrated amicus brief to the Supreme Court, Senator 
Sheldon Whitehouse of Rhode Island and four other 
Democratic senators suggested they would favor court-
packing if the Roberts Court did not change its ways.5 During 
 
Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204 (2008) (holding states could 
constitutionally require individuals to show photo identification before voting); 
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 747–48 
(2007) (invalidating race-based affirmative action programs for public schools); 
see also Brief of Senators Sheldon Whitehouse et al. as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Respondents, New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 
140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) [hereinafter Brief]; FELDMAN, FAILING, supra note 2, at 
173–86 (summarizing the early Roberts Court’s conservative decisions); Sheldon 
Whitehouse, Conservative Judicial Activism: The Politicization of the Supreme 
Court Under Chief Justice Roberts, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 195 (2015). 
 4. Thomas M. Keck, Court-Packing and Democratic Erosion (February 19, 
2020) (available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3476889); Michael Klarman, 
Why Democrats Should Pack the Supreme Court, TAKE CARE BLOG (Oct. 15, 2018), 
https://takecareblog.com/blog/why-democrats-should-pack-the-supreme-court. 
There are other ways to define court-packing. E.g., David Kosař & Katarína 
Šipulová, How to Fight Court-Packing?, 6 CONST. STUD. 133, 135 (2020). 
 5. Brief, supra note 3, at 17–18; see also Ian Millhiser, Five Democratic 
Senators Just Declared All-Out War on the Supreme Court, THINKPROGRESS (Aug. 
15, 2019, 10:48 AM), https://archive.thinkprogress.org/five-democratic- 
senators-just-declared-all-out-war-on-the-supreme-court-7601fed719e6/. 
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the 2019 presidential campaign season (leading up to the 
2020 election), at least two Democratic hopefuls, Senators 
Elizabeth Warren and Kamala Harris, supported the 
possibility of court-packing.6 And former Attorney General 
Eric Holder recommended that Democrats “should consider 
expanding the Supreme Court.”7 To be sure, other Democrats 
then campaigning for the presidential nomination (as well as 
some progressive commentators) remained more 
circumspect. They acknowledged that something must be 
done about the Court, but please, “No court-packing”; it is too 
extreme or radical.8 Pete Buttigieg and Beto O’Rourke 
supported adding justices but only in a stylized fashion that 
would supposedly “de-politicize” the Court,9 while Senator 
Bernie Sanders suggested that the current justices could be 
 
Senator Whitehouse had previously criticized the Roberts Court for politicizing 
adjudication. Whitehouse, supra note 3. 
 6. Rashaan Ayesh, Court Packing: Where the 2020 Candidates Stand, AXIOS 
(Oct. 2, 2019), https://www.axios.com/court-packing-where-2020-candidates-
stand-aff0e431-7624-42f0-b37f-a9091d1652f9.html; Kevin Uhrmacher et al., 
Would You Support Adding Justices to ‘Pack’ the Supreme Court?, WASH. POST: 
WHERE DEMOCRATS STAND, https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/politics/ 
policy-2020/voting-changes/supreme-court-packing/ (last updated Apr. 8, 2020). 
 7. Russell Wheeler, Pack the Court? Putting a Popular Imprint on the 
Federal Judiciary, BROOKINGS (Apr. 3, 2019) (quoting Holder); Michael Scherer, 
‘Court Packing’ Ideas Get Attention from Democrats, WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2019) 
(discussing Holder). 
 8. For commentators discussing court-packing, for and against, see 
Jonathan Bernstein, Don’t Pack the Supreme Court. Fix It., BLOOMBERG (Sept. 18, 
2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-09-18/ 
democrats-shouldn-t-pack-the-supreme-court-they-should-fix-it; Jamelle Bouie, 
Mad About Kavanaugh and Gorsuch? The Best Way to Get Even is to Pack the 
Court, NY TIMES (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/17/ 
opinion/kavanaugh-trump-packing-court.html; Larry Diamond, Don’t Mess With 
the Supreme Court, THE HILL (May 20, 2020, 4:30 PM), 
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/498707-dont-mess-with-the-supreme-court; 
Mondaire Jones, To Save Our Democracy, We Must Expand the Supreme Court, 
SALON (Apr. 26, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.salon.com/2020/04/26/to-save-our-
democracy-we-must-expand-the-supreme-court/; Kevin D. Williamson, The 
Partisan Majoritarianism of Jamelle Bouie’s Court-Packing Argument, NATIONAL 
REVIEW: THE CORNER (Sept. 17, 2019, 10:55 AM), https://www.national 
review.com/corner/civic-miseducation-from-the-new-york-times/. 
 9. Ayesh, supra note 6. 
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demoted to lower federal courts.10 Most important, the 
Democratic nominee, Joe Biden, opposed court-packing 
(more on that in the conclusion).11 
One key criticism of court-packing is that it will 
undermine the Court’s “sociological legitimacy”: public 
approval and acceptance of the Court’s authority and 
decisions.12 The people must, as a matter of fact, respect and 
 
 10. Ian Millhiser, Bernie Sanders’s Radical Plan to Fix the Supreme Court, 
VOX (Feb. 11, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/11/21131583/bernie-
sanders-supreme-court-rotation-lottery. 
 11. Adam Shaw, Biden Bucks Dem 2020 Field on Court Packing, 
Decriminalizing Border Crossings, FOX NEWS (July 6, 2019), 
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/biden-bucks-dem-field-on-court-packing-
decriminalizing-border-crossings. Julian Castro was another Democratic 
candidate opposing court-packing. Uhrmacher, supra note 6. 
 12. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME COURT 21–
24 (2018). Political scientists have extensively studied the Court’s legitimacy, 
though their various conclusions sometimes do not harmonize with each other. I 
will draw on the following sources: BRANDON L. BARTELS & CHRISTOPHER D. 
JOHNSTON, CURBING THE COURT: WHY THE PUBLIC CONSTRAINS JUDICIAL 
INDEPENDENCE (2020); TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 
(2010); JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND 
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN 
PEOPLE (2009) [hereinafter GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS]; Alex Badas, Policy 
Disagreement and Judicial Legitimacy: Evidence from the 1937 Court-Packing 
Plan, 48 J. LEGAL STUD. 377 (2019); Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. 
Johnston, On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the 
American Public, 57 AM. J. POL. SCI. 184 (2013); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. 
Gibson, The Etiology of Public Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 
635 (1992) [hereinafter Caldeira & Gibson, Etiology]; Dino P. Christenson & 
David M. Glick, Chief Justice Roberts’s Health Care Decision Disrobed: The 
Microfoundations of the Supreme Court’s Legitimacy, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 403 
(2015); Tom S. Clark & Jonathan P. Kastellec, Source Cues and Public Support 
for the Supreme Court, 43 AM. POL. RES. 504 (2015); James L. Gibson & Gregory 
A. Caldeira, Blacks and the United States Supreme Court: Models of Diffuse 
Support, 54 J. POL. 1120 (1992) [hereinafter Gibson & Caldeira, Blacks]; James 
L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of 
the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195 (2011) [hereinafter Gibson & 
Caldeira, Realism]; James L. Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, Reconsidering 
Positivity Theory: What Roles do Politicization, Ideological Disagreement, and 
Legal Realism Play in Shaping U.S. Supreme Court Legitimacy?, 14 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 592 (2017) [hereinafter Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering]; James L. 
Gibson & Michael J. Nelson. Is the U.S. Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Grounded 
in Performance Satisfaction and Ideology?, 59 AM. J. POL. SCI. 162 (2015) 
[hereinafter Gibson & Nelson, Legitimacy]; James L Gibson et al., On the 
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obey the Court’s decisions, or the Court will no longer be able 
to fulfill its function within the American constitutional 
system. Regardless of the historical and analytical 
justifications that might be offered in support of court-
packing, Democratic court-packing would be ill-advised if it 
would cause the American people to lose faith in the Court 
as a judicial institution. Hence, the more precise goal of this 
Essay: to defend court-packing against the charge that it 
would seriously impair the Court’s sociological legitimacy. To 
be sure, I will touch on other reasons to support court-
packing—for instance, court-packing has advantages over 
other potential Supreme Court changes—yet a 
comprehensive defense of court-packing is beyond the scope 
of this Essay. Such a full defense would require a book.13 
A premise of this argument is that law and politics 
dynamically interact in Supreme Court decision-making.14 
In most cases, the justices sincerely interpret the relevant 
legal texts—the Constitution, statutes, executive orders, and 
so on—but interpretation is never mechanical. No 
algorithmic method reveals the correct meaning of the text.15 
Constitutional interpretation, in particular, is never merely 
two plus two equals four. Instead, the justices’ political 
preferences always influence their interpretations of the 
Constitution and other texts, so law and politics always 
intertwine in the adjudicative process.16 If politics writ large 
 
Legitimacy of National High Courts, 92 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 343 (1998); Colin 
Glennon & Logan Strother, The Maintenance of Institutional Legitimacy in 
Supreme Court Justices’ Public Rhetoric, 7 J.L. AND CTS. 241 (2019). 
 13. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, PACK THE COURT! A DEFENSE OF SUPREME COURT 
EXPANSION (forthcoming 2021) [hereinafter PACK THE COURT]. 
 14. Stephen M. Feldman, Fighting the Tofu: Law and Politics in Scholarship 
and Adjudication, 14 CARDOZO PUB. L., POL’Y  & ETHICS J. 91, 91 (2015); Stephen 
M. Feldman, Supreme Court Alchemy: Turning Law and Politics Into 
Mayonnaise, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 57, 69–70 (2014). 
 15. HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 295, 309, 365 (Joel 
Weinsheimer & Donald Marshall trans., 2d revised ed. 2004); Ronald Dworkin, 
How Law is Like Literature, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 146, 160 (1985). 
 16. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 219 (“Everyone ought to agree that decisions on 
highly contentious matters blend law and politics.”); Gibson & Caldeira, Realism, 
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is the purposeful and overt pursuit of political goals—think 
of members of Congress trying to enact a statute—then 
Supreme Court decision-making is typically politics writ 
small. Politics shapes the justices’ interpretive conclusions 
even though the justices focus on the law. Politics writ small 
inheres in legal interpretation, or to put it conversely, legal 
interpretation is politics writ small. Unsurprisingly, then, 
the justices’ legal interpretations and judicial conclusions 
ordinarily coincide with their respective political 
preferences.17 
Unquestionably, many judges, legal scholars, and other 
Americans still believe in a law-politics dichotomy—the idea 
that law and politics must remain separate and 
independent—rather than a law-politics dynamic.18 From 
 
supra note 12, at 196 (“[N]o serious analyst would today contend that the 
decisions of the justices of the Supreme Court are independent of the personal 
ideologies of the judges. In this sense, legal realism has carried the day.”). Thus, 
the approach, accepted in this Essay—that the Supreme Court decides pursuant 
to a law-politics dynamic—rejects the attitudinal model of political science, which 
posits that in most cases politics alone determines Supreme Court outcomes. See 
JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993); JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT IN THE 
AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 38, 39 (2005). A growing number of political scientists 
and legal scholars now recognize that law and politics mix in Supreme Court 
adjudication. E.g., CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, COURTING PERIL 8 (2016); Frank B. 
Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court 
Decisionmaking, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1437, 1443–45 (2001). See generally MICHAEL 
A. BAILEY & FORREST MALTZMAN, THE CONSTRAINED COURT: LAW, POLITICS, AND 
THE DECISIONS JUSTICES MAKE (2011); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE SUPREME COURT 
AND THE AMERICAN ELITE, 1789-2008 (2009); Lawrence Baum, Law and Policy: 
More and Less Than a Dichotomy, in WHAT’S LAW GOT TO DO WITH IT? 71 (Charles 
Gardner Geyh ed., 2011); Howard Gillman, What’s Law Got to Do With It? 
Judicial Behavioralists Test the ‘Legal Model’ of Judicial Decision Making, 26 L. 
& SOC. INQUIRY 465 (2001).  
 17. Certainly, some Supreme Court decisions appear to be more politics writ 
large than writ small. The standard example is Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), 
which decided the 2000 presidential election. HOWARD GILLMAN, THE VOTES THAT 
COUNTED: HOW THE COURT DECIDED THE 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 2–5, 141–
43, 185–89 (2001); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of 
Constitutional History, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 1721, 1725 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Order Without Law, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 759 (2001). 
 18. Originalists insist that their interpretive method produces purely legal 
conclusions and removes politics from adjudication. ROBERT BORK, THE TEMPTING 
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this more traditional vantage, the justices must decide cases 
by neutrally applying the rule of law. Politics is a disease 
that threatens the health of the judicial process.19 If politics 
infects a Supreme Court case, then the decision is tainted.20 
Even so, an increasing number of legal scholars and political 
scientists have repudiated the law-politics dichotomy and 
 
OF AMERICA 5–6, 143–44 (1990); Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for 
Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999); Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, 
Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 Const. Comment 47 (2006); see John O. 
McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Original Methods Originalism: A New Theory 
of Interpretation and the Case Against Construction, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 751 
(2009). 
 19. Therefore, regardless of public perceptions of the Court, many 
commentators worry that court-packing will politicize the Court—by 
undermining the law-politics dichotomy—and therefore destroy the Court’s 
legitimacy (this legitimacy is legal or moral rather than sociological). See FALLON, 
supra note 12, at 22–24. Unsurprisingly, then, some Democrats nowadays worry 
that if they seize an opportunity to pack the Court, the Republicans will respond 
tit-for-tat, re-packing the Court with new conservative justices when they get the 
opportunity; once the Court is politicized, there will be no going back. See Daniel 
Epps & Ganesh Sitaraman, How to Save the Supreme Court, 129 YALE L.J. 148, 
172 (2019); David E. Pozen, Hardball and/as Anti-Hardball, 21 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. 
& PUB. POL’Y 949, 950 (2019); Mark Tushnet, The Pirate’s Code: Constitutional 
Conventions in U.S. Constitutional Law, 45 PEPP. L. REV. 481, 499–502 (2018) 
(questioning the tit-for-tat reasoning). Joe Biden has opposed court-packing 
partly because of a concern that Republicans will respond in kind. Jordain 
Carney, Democrats Warn Biden Against Releasing SCOTUS List, THE HILL (June 
12, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://thehillcom/homenews/senate/502380-democrats-
warn-biden-against-releasing-scotus-list. Bernie Sanders worried about the 
Republicans responding to Democratic court-packing tit-for-tat and 
delegitimizing the Court. Millhiser, supra note 10. Notice that if the Court 
decides cases pursuant to a law-politics dynamic—and the law-politics dichotomy 
is a myth—then the worry that court-packing will politicize the Court’s decision-
making process is misplaced. 
 20. Chief Justice Roberts, for instance, recently reiterated the law-politics 
dichotomy: “We will continue to decide cases according to the Constitution and 
laws without fear or favor. That’s necessary to avoid the politicization of the 
Court.” His message was unambiguous: Politics corrupts adjudication, and the 
justices will have none of it. Ariane de Vogue, John Roberts Says Supreme Court 
Doesn’t Work in a ‘Political Manner,’ CNN POLITICS (Sept. 24, 2019, 10:51 PM), 
https://www.cnn.com/2019/09/24/politics/john-roberts-new-york/index.html; 
Richard Wolf, His Supreme Court Divided Like the Country, Chief Justice John 
Roberts Prepares for Outsized Role as Umpire, USA TODAY (Sept. 25, 2019, 5:00 
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/09/25/chief-justice-
john-roberts-straddles-supreme-courts-left-and-right/2422156001/. 
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have subscribed to some notion of a law-politics dynamic.21 
They view the notion that the Court decides cases pursuant 
to pure law, bereft of politics, as a myth. Crucially, though, 
the reality of the law-politics dynamic in Supreme Court 
decision making does not lessen concerns about the Court’s 
sociological legitimacy. In other words, court-packing might 
still undermine the public’s faith in the Court, even if the 
law-politics dichotomy is a myth. 
Given the law-politics dynamic, we can readily 
understand why the Roberts Court consistently hands down 
conservative decisions.22 Political science empirical studies 
underscore the political tilt of the Court. Ever since the 
conservative Clarence Thomas replaced the liberal Thurgood 
Marshall in 1991, conservative blocs of justices have 
controlled the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts.23 These 
conservative justices have interpreted (and continue to 
interpret) the Constitution and other legal texts from within 
their conservative political horizons. Therefore, corporations 
and the wealthy usually win; the poor might not even get into 
 
 21. See supra text accompanying note 16 (giving examples of political 
scientists and legal scholars who accept some form of a law-politics dynamic). 
 22. Brief, supra note 3, at 12 (“With bare partisan majorities, the Court has 
influenced sensitive areas like voting rights, partisan gerrymandering, dark 
money, union power, regulation of pollution, corporate liability, and access to 
federal court, particularly regarding civil rights and discrimination in the 
workplace. Every single time, the corporate and Republican political interests 
prevailed.”). 
 23. For rankings of Supreme Court justices based on political ideology, see 
LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES 106–16 (2013) (listing and 
explaining rankings of Supreme Court justices based on political ideology 
including Martin-Quinn scores (accounting for changes over time) and Segal-
Cover scores (quantifying Court nominees’ perceived political ideologies at the 
time of appointment)); Lee Epstein et al., How Business Fares in the Supreme 
Court, 97 MINN. L REV. 1431, 1431–32 (2013). 
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court.24 Employers win; unions and employees lose.25 Whites 
win; people of color lose.26 Men win; women lose.27 Christians 
win; non-Christians lose.28 Republicans with entrenched 
political power win; Democratic voters lose.29 Gun owners 
 
 24. Horne v. Dep’t of Agric., 570 U.S. 350, 370 (2015) (holding that 
government restriction on the sale of raisins, based on a 1937 statute, was a 
taking and required just compensation); Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 
38 (2013) (interpreting Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to limit class actions 
against corporation); Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011) 
(invalidating state law restricting corporate sale of medical data); Citizens 
United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (invalidating 
restriction on corporate campaign expenditures); Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 
554 U.S. 471, 515 (2008) (limiting punitive damage awards against corporations); 
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642–43 (2007) (imposing 
restrictive time bar for employment discrimination lawsuits against 
corporations). 
 25. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 
2448, 2486 (2018) (holding that workers cannot be forced to pay union fees related 
solely to collective bargaining representation even though the workers benefit 
from the representation); Knox v. Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, 567 U.S. 298, 322 
(2012) (holding that public employee union could not impose a special assessment 
fee to support political advocacy even if union members could opt out); Borough 
of Duryea v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. 379, 399 (2011) (limiting government employee’s 
First-Amendment right to petition the government); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 
U.S. 410, 426 (2006) (limiting free-speech rights of government employees by 
distinguishing between speech as a citizen and speech as an employee). 
 26. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 
730 (2007) (invalidating race-based affirmative action programs). 
 27. June Med. Servs., LLC v. Gee, 139 S. Ct. 663, 662 (2019) (mem) 
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (Kavanaugh, Gorsuch, Thomas, and Alito voted to 
deny a stay of an admitting-privileges statute that would force the closure of 
abortion facilities); Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 642–43 (2007) (holding that woman’s 
sex discrimination claim under Title VII was time barred). 
 28. Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2074 (2019) (public 
display of 32-foot Christian cross is constitutional); Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 
2392, 2423 (2018) (upholding travel ban primarily targeting Muslims); 
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 
1747–48 (2018) (protecting Christian baker from anti-discrimination statute 
after he refused to bake a cake for a same-sex couple); Pleasant Grove City v. 
Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (allowing city to refuse to display a minority-
religion monument when already displaying the Ten Commandments). 
 29. Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484, 2508 (2019) (refusing to 
invalidate extreme partisan gerrymandering); Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 
2335 (2018) (upholding Texas voting restrictions). 
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win; everybody else loses.30 
If the Democrats were to gain control of both houses of 
Congress and the presidency in 2021 or later, they would 
undoubtedly begin enacting statutes implementing a 
progressive agenda. They might pass laws creating universal 
health care, strengthening environmental protections and 
fighting climate change, combatting structural and 
unconscious racism, protecting public health from pandemics 
(like the novel coronavirus), restricting gun ownership, 
restoring and fortifying voting rights, and protecting 
documented and undocumented immigrants.31 The Roberts 
Court, with its current personnel, could invoke and construct 
constitutional barriers that would threaten all of these 
laws.32 In the fall of 2019, conservative political 
commentators began laying the seeds for such a judicial 
backlash, arguing that Elizabeth Warren’s progressive 
agenda, for example, showed “open contempt for legal and 
constitutional boundaries.”33 
 
 30. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 791 (2010) (applying Second-
Amendment protections against state and local governments); District of 
Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (holding that the Second 
Amendment protects an individual right to own firearms). 
 31. The Democrats might need to eliminate the Senate cloture (or filibuster) 
rule to facilitate enactment of progressive legislation. Molly E. Reynolds, What is 
the Senate Filibuster, and What Would it Take to Eliminate It? BROOKINGS: 
POLICY 2020 (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/policy2020/votervital/ 
what-is-the-senate-filibuster-and-what-would-it-take-to-eliminate-it/. While Joe 
Biden has previously expressed support for the filibuster, he recently suggested 
being open to eliminating it. Max Cohen, Biden Signals Openness to Eliminating 
Senate Filibuster, POLITICO (July 14, 2020, 10:28 AM), https://www.politco.com/ 
news/2020/07/14/joe-biden-2020-filibuster-360587. 
 32. For progressives worrying about the Roberts Court, see Klarman, supra 
note 4; SAMUEL MOYN & AARON BELKIN, THE ROBERTS COURT WOULD LIKELY 
STRIKE DOWN CLIMATE CHANGE LEGISLATION 2 (2019). 
 33. Rich Lowry, Elizabeth Warren’s Threat to the Constitution, NATIONAL 
REVIEW (Oct. 11, 2019, 6:30 AM), https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/10/ 
elizabeth-warren-shows-contempt-for-legal-constitutional-boundaries/. In a 
recent decision, Justice Alito expressed a desire to resurrect the non-delegation 
doctrine as a means of limiting congressional power, even though the Court had 
not invoked the doctrine since 1935. Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 
2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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Yet, with control of both houses of Congress and the 
presidency, the Democrats could also enact a court-packing 
statute, adding at least four justices to the Supreme Court. 
Part I of this Essay compares court-packing to other possible 
Court changes, such as court-curbing measures that would 
reduce the Court’s power. Court-packing has multiple 
advantages over these other possibilities, especially from a 
progressive standpoint. One of the advantages is that even 
the current Roberts Court would almost certainly hold court-
packing, unlike other potential changes, to be constitutional. 
Part II focuses on the key criticism of court-packing, that 
it would undermine the Court’s sociological legitimacy. A 
central purpose of this Essay is to delve deeply into a 
burgeoning political science literature on the Court’s 
legitimacy. According to positivity theory, the American 
people embrace the Court with a favorable bias of good will. 
Diffuse support for the Court as an institution is therefore 
resilient, even when support for specific Court actions 
wavers.34 A handful of legal scholars have touched on the 
recent research in this area,35 but given our current political 
moment and recent Court developments, a more 
comprehensive exploration of this complicated literature 
seems necessary, particularly as it bears on the possibility of 
court-packing. Ultimately, this research suggests that court-
packing is unlikely to weaken the American people’s overall 
support for the Court. The Essay ends with a brief 
conclusion. 
A caveat about the politics of this Essay might be helpful 
at the outset. The Essay focuses on defending court-packing, 
in our current political and judicial environment, from one 
important objection. Namely, the Essay argues that 
 
 34. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 3, 39; Gibson & Nelson, 
Reconsidering, supra note 12, at 595. 
 35. E.g., FALLON, supra note 12, at 21–23; TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 219–21; 
Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. 
L. REV. 465, 505–45 (2018) [hereinafter Grove, Origins]. See generally Tara Leigh 
Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV. 2240 (2019). 
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Democratic court-packing will not undermine the Court’s 
sociological legitimacy. In theory, the argument could of 
course be turned around to support Republican court-
packing in some hypothetical future world. But that 
hypothetical world does not currently exist. As will be 
mentioned in Part II, no specific set of criteria must be 
satisfied to justify court-packing. Rather, the determination 
must and will be made politically, and the Court itself 
necessarily plays a significant role in that political 
determination. In short, court-packing and the Court’s 
legitimacy necessarily revolve around politics, and the 
politics of the current moment augur favorably for 
Democratic court-packing. Conjecturing about whether 
Republicans could justifiably pack the Court in some 
indeterminate future—without undermining the people’s 
diffuse support for the Court—would venture beyond this 
Essay into the world of fiction.36 
  
 
 36. For a discussion of whether the Republicans might respond tit-for-tat to 
Democratic court-packing, see infra note 111. For a fuller explanation of the 
politics justifying Democratic court-packing in our current environment, see 
PACK THE COURT, supra note 13. 
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I. COURT-PACKING COMPARED TO OTHER POSSIBLE 
SUPREME COURT CHANGES 
Progressive commentators have proposed numerous 
potential changes to the Court. One possibility is straight-
forward court-packing: simply adding justices to shift the 
partisan balance on the Court.37 But there have been other 
proposals, which fall into two general categories. First, 
dozens of times throughout American history, Congress has 
attempted to limit or reduce the scope of the Court’s power. 
The specifics of these court-curbing efforts typically reflected 
the particular contemporary political disputes. For instance, 
during the Progressive era of the early-twentieth century, 
Congress considered a bill that would have required at least 
a two-thirds majority of the justices to invalidate 
congressional (presumably Progressive) legislation.38 More 
frequently, Congress has considered bills that would carve 
away part of the Court’s subject matter jurisdiction—for all 
cases involving abortion, to take one example, or for all cases 
involving national security, to take another.39 If these court-
curbing bills had been enacted into law, then the Court 
would have been precluded from hearing and deciding cases 
in the designated areas. The most extreme of these proposals 
would completely remove the Court’s power to decide 
constitutional issues.40 
 
 37. Klarman, supra note 4. See generally Keck, supra note 4. 
 38. Stephen E. Sachs suggests some limit on the Court to this effect when he 
writes: “[W]e should precommit to limiting the Court’s freedom of action, binding 
it to some discrete set of preexisting rules until there is a very broad consensus 
for changing them.” Stephen E. Sachs, Supreme Court as Superweapon: A 
Response to Epps & Sitaraman, 129 YALE L.J. FORUM 93, 107 (2019). 
 39. STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A 
HISTORY 448–49 (2008) [hereinafter FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION] (jurisdiction-
stripping bills focused on national security during Red Scare); Clark, supra note 
12, at 36–42 (types of court-curbing); Shelden D. Elliott, Court-Curbing Proposals 
in Congress, 33 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597 (1958); Stuart S. Nagel, Court-Curbing 
Periods in American History, 18 VAND. L. REV. 925 (1965). 
 40. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999). 
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Second, particularly in recent years, commentators have 
suggested changes to the Court’s size and makeup that 
would ostensibly “save” or “preserve” the Court’s 
institutional role as an apolitical, “nonpartisan,” or “neutral” 
judicial decision maker.41 These proposals can be subdivided 
into two basic types. First, some recommend term limits for 
the Supreme Court justices. While the specifics can vary, the 
typical proposal suggests staggered eighteen-year terms so 
that each president appoints a justice every two years.42 
Second, several commentators propose expanding the 
number of justices in some stylized fashion so the expansion 
does not amount to straight-forward court-packing. For 
instance, Tracey George and Chris Guthrie recommend 
increasing the Supreme Court to fifteen justices who would 
function more like judges on a federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals. In other words, randomly selected panels of three 
justices would decide most cases, while all the justices sitting 
en banc would decide the unusual or special case.43 Daniel 
Epps and Ganesh Sitaraman have developed two alternative 
schemes also based on a stylized Court expansion. One they 
call the “Supreme Court Lottery”44: Every judge currently on 
a federal Circuit Court of Appeals would literally become a 
Supreme Court justice (there are currently 179 circuit court 
 
 41. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 19, at 151–52. 
 42. See Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington, The Supreme Court Renewal 
Act: A Return to Basic Principles, in REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR 
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 467, 467–70 (Roger C. Cramton & Paul D. Carrington 
eds., 2006); Steven G. Calabresi & James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme 
Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 769, 822–30 (2006); 
Roger C. Cramton, Reforming the Supreme Court, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1323–
24 (2007); Pozen, supra note 19, at 951–52. 
 43. Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States Supreme 
Court in the Courts’ of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1457–58, 1465–66 
(2009). See also Jonathan Turley, Unpacking the Court: The Case for the 
Expansion of the United States Supreme Court in the Twenty-First Century, 33 
PERSP. ON POL. SCI. 155, 155–56 (2004) (recommending Court expansion). 
 44. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 19, at 181–82 (adding another 
requirement: “only a 6-3 supermajority of the Court, rather than a simple 
majority, could hold a federal statute (and possibly state statutes, depending on 
how one weighs federalism values) unconstitutional.”). 
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judges). Out of this pool, random panels of nine would decide 
cases. Panels, though, would be politically restricted: “each 
panel would be prohibited from having more than five 
Justices nominated by a President of a single political party 
(that is, no more than five Republicans or Democrats at a 
time).”45 The second scheme they call the “Balanced Bench.” 
It would increase the Court to fifteen justices, including five 
Republicans and five Democrats. “These ten Justices would 
then select five additional Justices chosen from current 
circuit (or possibly district) court judges. The catch? The ten 
partisan-affiliated Justices would need to select the 
additional five Justices unanimously (or at least by a strong 
supermajority requirement).”46 
Putting aside straight-forward court-packing, all of these 
proposed changes to the Court—whether a court-curbing 
measure, an imposition of term limits, or a stylized 
expansion—are problematic. Most if not all of them are of 
questionable constitutionality.47 Epps and Sitaraman admit 
that even their own proposals, the Supreme Court Lottery 
and the Balanced Bench, might be unconstitutional.48 Given 
this, one might expect the Roberts Court to invalidate any 
enacted change: After all, these proposals would diminish 
the power of either the current justices or the Court as a 
whole. The Roberts and Rehnquist Courts have been, on the 
one hand, wary of congressional enactments and, on the 
other hand, protective of judicial power, so the justices would 
likely be hostile to any congressional tampering with the 
 
 45. Id. at 182. 
 46. Id. at 193. Among the Democrats campaigning for president in 2019, Pete 
Buttigieg and Beto O’Rourke seemed to support the Balanced Bench approach, 
David A. Graham, The Democrats Discover the Supreme Court, THE ATLANTIC 
(June 4, 2019) https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/06/buttigiegs-
supreme-court-plan-and-democratic-party/590905/. One article suggested Bernie 
Sanders might consider something like the Supreme Court Lottery. Millhiser, 
supra note 10. 
 47. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 
162–81 (6th ed. 2019); DAVID O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER 357–65 (12th ed. 2020). 
 48. Epps & Sitaraman, supra note 19, at 185–92, 200–05. 
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Court itself.49 Some of the proposals have problems unique 
to them. For example, any court-curbing reduction of the 
Court’s subject matter jurisdiction would only dent the 
Court’s power. If Congress were to attempt to eliminate the 
Court’s power to adjudicate the constitutionality of race-
based affirmative action programs, to take one illustration, 
the Court would still be empowered to protect the wealthy 
and the economic marketplace, to protect mainstream 
Christians rather than religious minorities, and to protect 
men but not women. Historically, such court-curbing 
measures have rarely been enacted and have achieved only 
“relative success”—with that limited success typically 
arising only because one or more justices shifted their 
judicial positions in response to the court-curbing threat.50 
In the words of political scientist David O’Brien, if Congress 
seeks to control a recalcitrant Court, “[c]ourt-curbing 
legislation is not a very effective weapon.”51 To be sure, in 
these highly polarized times, we cannot reasonably 
anticipate a court-curbing threat to induce one of the 
conservative justices to shift leftward—whether Chief 
 
 49. For cases showing the Court’s protectiveness toward judicial as opposed 
to congressional power, see Trump v. Mazars, 140 S. Ct. 2019 (2020) (remanding 
the House of Representatives’ demand for Trump’s income tax returns while 
constraining congressional reach); Trump v. Vance, 140 S. Ct. 2412 (2020) 
(remanding New York prosecutorial demand for Trump’s income tax returns but 
recognizing grand jury’s power to demand the returns); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 
U.S. 723 (2008) (invalidating congressional act stripping habeas corpus 
jurisdiction from the federal courts for enemy combatants); Clinton v. Jones, 520 
U.S. 681 (1997) (holding that president is not immune to lawsuits for conduct 
prior to becoming president); see also THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST 
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 2 (2004); O’Brien, supra note 47, at 30–32; Lee 
Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Is the Roberts Court Especially Activist? A Study of 
Invalidating (and Upholding) Federal, State, and Local Laws, 61 EMORY L.J. 737 
(2012). Thomas M. Keck, Party, Policy, or Duty: Why Does the Supreme Court 
Invalidate Federal Statutes?, 101 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 321, 325 (2007) (compiling a 
list of federal statutes invalidated by the Court from 1981 to 2013); Keith E. 
Whittington, The Least Activist Supreme Court in History? The Roberts Court and 
the Exercise of Judicial Review, 89 Notre Dame L. Rev. 2219 (2014). 
 50. Nagel, supra note 39, at 926, 943. 
 51. O’BRIEN, supra note 47, at 363; see also CLARK, supra note 12, at 256–58 
(many court-curbing bills are introduced as mere political posturing). 
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Justice Roberts or anybody else.52 
Finally, any change to the Court that would ostensibly 
return the Court to apolitical or neutral decision-making will 
necessarily fail. As discussed in the introduction, the Court 
always decides cases pursuant to a law-politics dynamic. 
Apolitical Supreme Court adjudication is a myth. At best, 
some of the proposed stylized expansions of the Court will 
leave us with a plethora of five-to-four or eight-to-seven 
decisions in politically salient cases (or some other partisan 
split, depending on the total number of justices). In fact, even 
supposedly neutral decisions are likely to be conservative 
because polarization has pushed Republican justices more 
rightward than Democratic justices leftward.53 
 
 52. For cases suggesting Roberts is the most likely conservative justice to shift 
leftward, see Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 140 S. Ct. 
1891 (2020) (Roberts opinion holding Trump administration rescission of DACA 
violated APA procedural requirements); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 
2551 (2019) (Roberts opinion holding Trump administration addition of 
citizenship question to census violated APA procedural requirements); see also 
Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization Turned 
the Supreme Court into A Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301 (2016) 
(emphasizing how polarization has changed the Court). Nevertheless, Roberts’s 
supposedly liberal opinions often construct deeply conservative doctrines. 
Stephen M. Feldman, Chief Justice Roberts’s Marbury Moment: The Affordable 
Care Act Case (NFIB v. Sebelius), 13 WYO. L. REV. 335 (2013). For discussions 
rejecting the notion that Roberts is liberal, see Michael C. Dorf, Two Cheers for 
the Roberts Concurrence in the Judgment in June Medical, DORF ON LAW (June 
29, 2020), https://www.dorfonlaw.org/2020/06/two-cheers-for-roberts-concur 
rence-in.html (emphasizing Roberts’s discussion of stare decisis); Hugh Hewitt, 
Chief Justice Roberts is no Liberal and the Conservative Judicial Project Isn’t 
Dead, WASH. POST (June 19, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/ 
opinions/2020/06/19/chief-justice-roberts-is-no-liberal-conservative-judicial-
project-isnt-dead/; Leah Litman, It Wasn’t Roberts that Changed this Term. It was 
the Cases SCOTUS Heard, SLATE (July 13, 2020), https://www.slate.com/news-
and-politics/2020/07/roberts-scotus-conservative-cases.html; Jay Michaelson, No, 
Chief Justice John Roberts Isn’t Liberal–He’s a Different Kind of Conservative, 
THE DAILY BEAST (June 29, 2020), https://www.thedailybeast.com/no-chief-
justice-roberts-isnt-liberalhes-a-different-kind-of-conservative; Kimberly 
Strawbridge Robinson, Yes, Roberts is in the Middle. No, He’s not a Liberal, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (July 9, 2020), https://www.news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-
week/yes-roberts-is-in-the-middle-no-hes-not-a-liberal. 
 53. Devins & Baum, supra note 52, at 305–06 (on the Court’s shift rightward); 
see also Osita Nwanevu, We’re Not Polarized Enough, THE NEW REPUBLIC (May 
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From the Democratic standpoint, when straight-forward 
court-packing is compared to the possible alternative 
changes to the Court, court-packing is superior in two 
important ways.54 First, only court-packing would assure 
that an altered Court—a new progressive Roberts Court—
would be able to counter the conservative legacy of the 
current Roberts Court. The Court has handed down 
numerous conservative decisions and constructed 
conservative constitutional doctrines that, if left untouched, 
can lead to conservative results in the Supreme Court and 
the lower courts for decades.55 Democrats can guarantee a 
change in direction only by establishing a progressive 
majority on the Court. In fact, if the current Roberts Court 
were to feel threatened, whether by a court-packing or court-
curbing bill, the conservative justices might be motivated to 
imminently construct even more and deeper conservative 
doctrines before it is too late. For instance, the conservative 
justices might reach for an abortion case that would allow 
them to overturn Roe v. Wade and eliminate a woman’s right 
to choose abortion, or they might reach for a Second-
Amendment case that would allow a strengthening of gun 
rights.56 Only outright Democratic court-packing could 
overcome the current Court’s substantial conservative 
legacy. 
Second, the constitutional arguments recognizing 
 
19, 2020), https://www.newrepublic.com/article/157599/were-not-polarized-
enough-ezra-klein-book-review (arguing to accept polarization and working from 
there, rather than trying to counter it). One commentator has suggested reducing 
the Court to eight justices to avoid partisan decisions. Eric J. Segall, Eight 
Justices Are Enough: A Proposal to Improve the United States Supreme Court, 45 
PEPP. L. REV. 547 (2018). Of course, in this situation, the Court might be unable 
to actually decide politically salient cases. 
 54. Depending on how one defines court-curbing, it is possible to categorize 
court-packing as a type of court-curbing. Clark, supra note 12, at 28, 37–39, 52–
54. 
 55. See supra note 3 (listing multiple conservative Roberts Court decisions). 
 56. New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. City of New York, 140 S. Ct. 1525, 
1527–28, 1541–42 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court should 
clarify Second-Amendment protections). 
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Congress’s power to change the size of the Court—without 
any of the stylized alterations suggested by other 
commentators—are overwhelmingly strong. Even the 
current Court, consistently hostile to congressional 
enactments, would find it difficult to invalidate a statute 
simply adding  justices to the Court.57 Nothing in the 
constitutional text limits congressional power to set the size 
of the Court.58 Moreover, history reveals that the Court has 
fluctuated between a minimum of six and a maximum of ten 
seats. Before 1869, Congress enacted statutes changing the 
Court’s size seven times, often for political reasons.59 During 
one politically volatile decade, the 1860s, Congress increased 
the Court to ten seats, dropped it to seven, then settled on 
nine. To be sure, besides court-packing, Democrats could 
attempt to change the makeup of the Court through one 
other clearly constitutional approach: impeachment. The 
Constitution allows Congress to impeach and remove 
Supreme Court justices and other federal judges.60 But the 
 
 57. Michael C. Dorf, How the Written Constitution Crowds Out the 
Extraconstitutional Rule of Recognition, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 69, 74–75, 79 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth Einar Himma 
eds., 2009) (acknowledging that text and history support the constitutionality of 
court-packing). 
 58. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be 
vested in one supreme Court . . . .”). 
 59. TUSHNET, supra note 2, at 214 (“Most of the changes in the Court’s size 
were done for good-government reasons, with a soupçon of politics.”). He then 
modified this view by acknowledging that multiple changes “were purely 
political.” Id. Joshua Braver is a legal scholar who supports court-curbing rather 
than court-packing. He argues that prior congressional changes to the Court’s 
size were insufficiently political to support any historical argument supporting 
court-packing. Joshua Braver, Court-Packing: An American Tradition?, (Harvard 
Pub. Law Working Paper No. 19-44), 10, 25–39 https://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3483927. One problem with his analysis is a failure 
to account for the influence of extreme polarization in today’s political climate as 
opposed to the past. See CLARK, supra note 12, at 25–61 (on the politics of 
numerous court-curbing episodes); Clark & Kastellec, supra note 12, at 509–10, 
524–27 (arguing polarization is likely to influence public opinion of the Court’s 
legitimacy). See generally Devins & Baum, supra note 52 (emphasizing that 
polarization has changed the Court). 
 60. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (House power to impeach); U.S. CONST. art. I, 
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only Supreme Court justice the House has ever impeached 
was the Federalist Samuel Chase in 1804. Impeachment was 
based on Chase’s notorious partisanship, yet the Republican-
controlled Senate could not muster the required two-thirds 
supermajority to convict him.61 Ever since, the odds of 
impeaching a justice solely on political grounds have been 
practically nil. 
Although the textual and historical arguments for the 
constitutionality of court-packing are strong, some 
commentators nonetheless argue that history—usually 
centered on the 1937 failure to enact President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s court-packing plan—has established a norm 
against court-packing.62 This argument has three 
 
§ 3, cl. 6 (Senate power to try impeachments). 
 61. S. JOURNAL, 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 524–27 (1805); ERIK W. AUSTIN, POLITICAL 
FACTS OF THE UNITED STATES SINCE 1789, at 50 (1986) (refer to Table 1.20 for a 
partisan composition of the United States Senate); STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 699 (1993); 1 MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL 
FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FOUNDING–1890, at 200 (2d ed. 2002); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF 
LIBERTY: A HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789-1815, at 422–25 (2009); James 
Haw, Chase, Samuel, in THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 
103 (Roger K. Newman ed., 2009); see FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION, supra note 39, 
at 70–100 (explaining the Sedition Act controversy). Chase had displayed his 
partisanship while conducting several Sedition Act trials of Republicans in 1800. 
Later, while riding circuit, Chase charged the Republicans with leading the 
nation toward “mobocracy,” and purportedly denigrated President Jefferson 
during an 1803 grand jury charge. UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra, at 199. Seeking 
retribution, House Republicans impeached Chase in early 1804 on eight counts. 
Id. Republicans at the time held twenty-one of the thirty-four Senate seats, but 
they could not muster the two-thirds supermajority needed to convict on any 
count (a slight majority supported conviction on two of the counts). Id. at 200. If 
the Senate had convicted, some Republicans were supposedly ready to attempt to 
remove Chief Justice John Marshall from office too. Id. 200–01. 
 62. Dorf, supra note 57, at 74 (suggesting there is a norm or convention 
against court-packing); Curtis A. Bradley & Neil S. Siegel, Historical Gloss, 
Constitutional Conventions, and the Judicial Separation of Powers, 105 GEO. L.J. 
255, 321–22 (2017) (without reaching a conclusion, authors recognize that some 
commentators would argue that there is a constitutional norm against court-
packing); Grove, Origins, supra note 35, at 512–14; see also STEVEN LEVITSKY & 
DANIEL ZIBLATT, HOW DEMOCRACIES DIE 130–32 (2018) (arguing norms of 
forbearance should preclude court-packing). 
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weaknesses.63 First, even if such a norm existed, Mitch 
McConnell and the Senate Republicans already shattered it 
in 2016 and 2017, when they refused to open confirmation 
hearings for Merrick Garland. McConnell and the 
Republicans de facto reduced the Court to eight justices for 
more than a year. When given a chance to confirm a 
conservative Republican, Neil Gorsuch, they returned the 
Court to its nine-justice size.64 
Second, this anti-court-packing position disregards 
much of American history, when Congress was expressly 
changing the Court’s size. This slighting of history and 
bloated emphasis on the legislative defeat of FDR’s court-
packing plan seems especially tenuous given that leading 
contemporary legal scholars and key members of Congress 
supported FDR’s plan. Legal realists like Karl Llewellyn, 
who had been questioning the Court’s legal formalism for 
years, approved of FDR’s approach to the Court.65 More 
important from a political standpoint, FDR’s plan had 
enough congressional support to give it a reasonable chance 
of passage. New Dealers in the House of Representatives 
largely supported the plan. While the Senate was more 
divided, several key senators, including Democratic Senate 
Majority Leader Joe Robinson, Hugo Black of Alabama, and 
Robert M. La Follette of Wisconsin, avowed their support, 
although the chances for enactment evaporated when 
Senator Robinson suddenly passed away.66 
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Finally, if a norm against court-packing were to exist, it 
would be based on a fallacy, that the Supreme Court should 
be a pristine legal institution, free of politics. But political 
considerations pervade the makeup of the Court and its 
decision-making process.67 If anything, we should 
understand the threat of court-packing as an important 
aspect of the separation of powers, part of the Constitution’s 
checks and balances. The possibility of court-packing gives 
the people a political check on the Court for when it departs 
too far from the dominant national political alliance.68 
Rather than interpreting history, whether the failure to 
enact FDR’s plan or other events, as establishing a norm 
against court-packing, we should recognize that history 
shows the Court engaged in a type of dialogue with Congress, 
the President, and the public about the scope of judicial 
power.69 
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II. SUPREME COURT LEGITIMACY AND COURT-PACKING 
Even if the Democrats’ best means for changing the 
Court is straight-forward court-packing, should the 
Democrats hesitate? Lacking the power of either the purse 
or the sword, the Court depends on its sociological 
legitimacy.70 Without sufficiently widespread public 
approval of the Court as an institution, the Court’s authority 
to decide disputes will dissipate.71 What if Democratic court-
packing might cause many people to lose faith in the Court’s 
legitimacy? 
Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt’s important recent 
book, How Democracies Die, bolsters this criticism of court-
packing. Similar to Robert A. Dahl and other post-World War 
II democratic theorists, they argue that democracy depends 
on the preservation of certain cultural (democratic) norms, 
including “norms of forbearance” that preclude 
“constitutional hardball.”72 From their perspective, court-
 
jurisprudence). 
 70. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 199–243 (2d 
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Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284 (1957).  Instead, 
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show the Court boldly championing the rights of a black Americans in the face of 
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State Action Doctrine, 1940-1990, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 273, 288–90 (2010). 
White southerners who supported legalized racial segregation had become 
national outliers; the Court forced them to acquiesce to more mainstream views, 
as understood from a national vantage. Id. at 298–99. 
 72. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 62, at 8–9, 97–117. Mark Tushnet is 
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packing would contravene such norms of forbearance and 
lead to “democratic breakdown.”73 For that reason, autocrats 
such as Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey and Viktor Orban 
in Hungary have sought to pack and weaponize the courts, 
using the law to protect themselves while attacking 
opponents.74 In such situations, the people typically lose 
faith in the courts as well as other democratic institutions. 
Court-packing, in short, is likely to contribute to the 
degradation and eventual destruction of democracy and its 
institutions. In our contemporary United States, then, court-
packing could undermine the Court’s institutional (or 
sociological) legitimacy.75 
Four reasons undermine this objection to court-packing. 
First, we should be wary about attaching too much 
significance to public opinion about the Supreme Court. Polls 
leave much ambiguity regarding public perceptions of the 
Court. Some polls show that Americans hold wildly diverse 
opinions about the Court, though the poll questions rarely 
distinguish between public perceptions of the Court as an 
institution and perceptions of specific and recent Court 
decisions.76 To be certain, many polls suggest that most 
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 74. Kosař & Šipulová,  supra note 4, at 134–35. 
 75. LEVITSKY & ZIBLATT, supra note 62, at 130–32. Court-packing, in other 
words, could contribute to democratic or constitutional “degradation” or “rot.” 
FELDMAN, FAILING, supra note 2, at 231 (discussing degradation). See generally 
Jack M. Balkin, Constitutional Crisis and Constitutional Rot, 77 MD. L. REV. 147 
(2017) (discussing rot). 
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Americans know and care little about the Court. A 2018 C-
SPAN survey showed fewer than one-half of likely American 
voters could name at least one Supreme Court justice; the 
same was true in a 2009 survey.77 One 2016 poll revealed 
that almost 10 percent of college graduates believed the 
television judge, Judge Judy, sat on the Court; the 
percentage rose to 13.1 percent when the poll expanded 
beyond college graduates.78 A 2015 poll found that 32 percent 
of Americans could not identify the Supreme Court as a 
branch of the United States government, while 28 percent 
believed 5-4 Court rulings were “sent back either to Congress 
for reconsideration or to the lower courts for a decision.”79 
My own (anecdotal) experience suggests the need for 
skepticism when evaluating public perceptions of the Court. 
Shortly after Justice Scalia’s death, I happened to go to my 
dentist, an articulate man in his mid-30s and obviously a 
graduate of college and dental school. Knowing I am a law 
professor, he disclosed that he believed Scalia had been a 
“great” justice. By coincidence, I had recently published an 
article on the history of originalism, so with trepidation I 
asked if he would be interested in reading my article.80 My 
dentist’s response? He had never heard of originalism. At 
that point, I decided not to ask him why he admired Scalia. 
Quite possibly, my dentist had responded to “partisan source 
cues.”81 Knowing his family of origin, I suspect that he was 
politically conservative, and conservative commentators and 
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political leaders had long heaped praise on Scalia’s 
jurisprudence. Such source cues can apparently engender 
concern for as well as support for the Court. Exit polls from 
the 2016 presidential election revealed that 21 percent of 
voters named Supreme Court appointments as the most 
important factor in determining their votes, a greater 
percentage than in the 2008 election. Even so, prior to the 
2016 election, surveys suggested that Supreme Court 
appointments was only the ninth most important issue.82 
In any event, recent political science studies suggest 
caution when evaluating public knowledge about the Court. 
Evidence shows that many people have general knowledge 
about the Court—for instance, that justices are appointed 
rather than elected—while those same people know few 
specific details, except when the details directly affect 
them.83 My dentist illustrates this phenomenon: He knew 
something about the Court—in fact, he knew that Scalia had 
been a justice—but he did not know the details of Scalia’s 
originalist jurisprudence.84 Most important, perhaps, this 
widespread general knowledge of the Court entails strong 
diffuse support for the Court as an institution rather than 
specific support for particular case decisions. This diffuse 
support or loyalty to the Court is grounded on, in the words 
of James L. Gibson and Gregory A. Caldeira, “broader 
 
 82. Top Voting Issues in 2016 Election, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (July 7, 2016), 
https://www.people-press.org/2016/07/07/4-top-voting-issues-in-2016-election/; 
see also Election 2016, Exit Polls, CNN POLITICS, http://www.cnn.com/ 
election/results/exit-polls (last updated Nov. 23, 2016); NBC News Exit Poll: 
Future Supreme Court Appointments Important Factor in Presidential Voting, 
NBC NEWS, (Nov. 8, 2016), http://www.nbcnews.com/card/nbc-news-exit-poll-
future-supreme-court-appointments-important-factor-n680381. On the politics of 
individual viewpoints, see generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, 
Institutional Flip-Flops, 94 TEX. L. REV. 485 (2016) (arguing that vigorous 
institutional commitments—for example, to federalism—change when necessary 
to fit one’s political ideology). 
 83. GIBSON & CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, supra note 12, at 17–35. 
 84. Stephen M. Feldman, Justice Scalia and the Originalist Fallacy, in THE 
CONSERVATIVE REVOLUTION OF ANTONIN SCALIA 189 (Howard Schweber & David 
A. Schultz eds., 2018). 
1548 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol.  68 
commitments to democratic institutions and processes, and 
more generally in knowledge of the role of the judiciary in 
the American democratic system.”85 
The importance of this diffuse support for the Court 
leads to a second reason not to be overly worried about public 
perceptions of court-packing. Regardless of how much people 
know and care about the Court, we should not condescend to 
those who do know and care. The crux of the objection to 
court-packing—that it would cause the public to lose faith in 
the Court—is grounded on an assumption that the public (or 
that segment of the public with reasonable knowledge of the 
Court) could not handle the truth about judicial decision 
making—that the justices’ political views matter in the 
Court’s decisions. But if the law-politics dichotomy is a myth, 
if the Court instead decides pursuant to a law-politics 
dynamic, then must we still propagate the myth for fear the 
people need its comfort? If God is dead—or never existed—
must we nonetheless encourage the people to keep praying? 
If so, then we might as well as renounce democracy. Tell the 
people the truth, as we understand it, and let the people 
decide. Sociological legitimacy might even increase if people 
understood the truth, that Supreme Court decision making 
is politics writ small.86 
In fact, political science studies suggest that the public’s 
diffuse support for the Court is resilient, sustained by “a 
reservoir of favorable attitudes or good will.”87 A “positivity 
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bias” helps the Court maintain this good will and 
institutional legitimacy. According to positivity (bias) theory, 
“anything that causes people to pay attention to courts— 
even controversies— winds up reinforcing institutional 
legitimacy through exposure to the legitimizing symbols 
associated with law and courts.”88 Even when the Court 
issues a decision contrary to an individual’s personal views, 
that individual is unlikely to lose faith in the Court. If 
anything, when news of Court activities draws an 
individual’s attention, then that attention (to the Court) will 
likely reinforce the individual’s positive views of the 
institution. In a sense, the more one knows about the Court, 
the more one is likely to find its decisions legitimate (the 
opposite is true for Congress).89 
To be sure, the Court’s legitimacy is not bulletproof: It 
depends on a perception that the Court is not merely another 
political institution. For instance, a confirmation battle in 
the Senate is unlikely to damage the Court’s legitimacy, but 
if widely viewed advertisements (related to the confirmation 
battle) attack the Court as purely political, then diffuse 
support for the Court is likely to diminish.90 Thus, while a 
politically salient Supreme Court decision might offend some 
Americans based on political ideology,91 a lack of specific 
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support for that decision does not translate into a meaningful 
reduction of diffuse support. Only those Americans who 
already reject the Court as an institution—those individuals 
who have not developed a favorable attitude and good will 
toward the Court—are likely to denigrate it because of a 
small number of specific decisions. For the most part, the 
Court is able to maintain its institutional legitimacy despite 
“the ideological and partisan cross-currents that so wrack 
contemporary American politics.”92 Even so, sustained 
disappointment with the Court’s decisions over the long 
term, especially in politically salient cases, can weaken 
diffuse support for the Court. To take one example, diffuse 
support for the Court diminished among black Americans 
during the post-Warren Court years (consider the Burger, 
Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts’ consistent hostility toward 
race-based affirmative action).93 
Significantly, the people’s diffuse support for and loyalty 
to the Court does not depend on the myth of pure law—that 
is, the myth of the law-politics dichotomy. To the contrary, 
many Americans seem to understand that Supreme Court 
 
 92. Gibson & Nelson, Legitimacy, supra note 12, at 173. Gibson and Nelson 
criticize the conclusions of Brandon L. Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, who 
had argued that an individual’s political ideology determined his or her diffuse 
support for the Court. Bartels & Johnston, supra note 12, at 196–97. Gibson and 
Nelson add, though, that for a small group of people, ideological disagreement 
can affect perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. Gibson & Nelson, Reconsidering, 
supra note 12, at 613. They define legal realists as those individuals who 
“understand that Supreme Court decisions are based on the justices’ ideologies, 
values, and opinions on the issues at litigation.” Id. at 597. Then they conclude 
that a subset of legal realists are most likely to be influenced by perceived 
ideological differences from the Court: namely, those legal realists who measure 
highest or strongest (on the measures for belief in realism) and who 
simultaneously do not view the Court as just another political institution. Id. at 
607–09. Bartles and Johnston have responded and elaborated their emphasis on 
political ideology. CURBING, supra note 12. 
 93. CLARK, supra note 12, at 18; Caldeira & Gibson, Etiology, supra note 12, 
at 640 & n.7; Gibson & Caldeira, Blacks, supra note 12, at 1140–41; Glennon & 
Strother, supra note 12, at 243. For decisions invalidating race-based affirmative 
action programs, see generally Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. 
Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007); Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 
(1995); Univ. of Calif. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
2020] COURT-PACKING TIME? 1551 
decision making entails a combination of law and politics—
the law-politics dynamic. As Gibson and Caldeira conclude: 
“[T]he American people seem to accept that judicial 
decisionmaking (sic) can be discretionary and grounded in 
ideologies, but also principled and sincere. Judges differ from 
ordinary politicians in acting sincerely . . . .”94 This insight 
into the Court’s institutional legitimacy has enormous 
implications for Democratic court-packing. Although a court-
packing controversy would undoubtedly entail debates over 
the Court’s politically-charged decisions, the Court’s overall 
diffuse support would probably remain relatively stable. 
Most likely, in these hyper-polarized times, individuals’ 
political ideologies—leaning Republican or Democratic—
would influence reactions to a Democratic court-packing 
plan. Republicans of course would oppose it, but many 
Democrats would likely support it, especially if Democratic 
politicians emphasized that they sought to return the Court 
to sincere and principled decision making.95 To the extent 
that individual views of the Court’s legitimacy might change 
in response to a court-packing plan, partisan shifts would 
likely cancel each other out. In the end, despite divergent 
views of the court-packing plan, the overall legitimacy of the 
Court itself would likely be sustained (or even grow) whether 
because of a positivity bias favoring the Court or a 
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widespread Democratic (policy) opposition to the Roberts 
Court’s conservatism (as well as Democratic abhorrence 
toward recent Republican Senate maneuvers, including the 
rushed confirmation of Barrett, which resulted in an ironclad 
six-justice conservative bloc).96 
Hence, a third reason not to worry about the effect of 
court-packing on the Court’s legitimacy: Our views of court-
packing should be based on the political turn necessary for 
court-packing to be considered in the first place. In other 
words, if the Republicans retain control of the presidency or 
the Senate or both in the 2020 election, then the Democrats 
will be unable to try court-packing in 2021. Only if and when 
the Democrats sweep, gaining control of the presidency plus 
both houses of Congress, can the Democrats even attempt to 
pack the Court. Whenever a Democratic sweep occurs, 
whether in 2020 or subsequently, the thrust of public opinion 
might have shifted sufficiently in a progressive direction so 
as to make court-packing publicly palatable. 
To be clear, I have not attempted to delineate a specific 
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set of criteria that must be satisfied to justify court-packing. 
To the contrary, the determination must and will be made 
politically. The Court itself, of course, plays a significant role 
in this political determination. Have the justices been 
deciding cases that politically depart from a national political 
alliance? Most likely, “abusive judicial review”—issuing 
decisions denigrating and weakening rather than protecting 
and strengthening democracy—would provoke public 
concern.97 Yet even abusive judicial review would not be a 
prerequisite to court-packing; rather, in a still-functioning 
democracy, the totality of political circumstances would be 
determinative. In the end, as positivity theory suggests, 
sustained disappointment with the Court’s decisions, 
especially in politically salient cases, would weaken diffuse 
(political) support for the Court.98 Consequently, if and when 
the Democrats sweep, Democratic voters would likely have 
soured on the conservative Roberts Court—which after all 
followed the conservative Rehnquist Court. In fact, although 
the Democrats have won the popular vote in six out of the 
last seven presidential elections, a conservative bloc of 
justices has controlled the Court for nearly thirty years.99 A 
Democratic sweep, quite possibly, would manifest in part 
public support to “rein in” the conservative justices of the 
Roberts Court.100 Historical evidence shows that, in the 
1930s, New Deal voters generally supported FDR’s court-
packing plan.101 More recently, during the decade of the 
2010s, at least ten states attempted court-packing in their 
respective state judiciaries, with two states being 
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successful.102 If the people vote for a Democratic Congress 
and president, they very well might support a move to pack 
the Court. 
Without question, in the political atmosphere after a 
Democratic sweep, a Democratic court-packing plan would 
contribute to the ongoing dialogue over Supreme Court 
power and decision making. As a matter of political strategy, 
congressional Democrats would not need to falsely celebrate 
the law-politics dichotomy—the myth of pure law—but they 
would likely benefit by emphasizing that the current Court 
has departed from principled decision making.103 The result 
of a Democratic court-packing plan would likely be an 
increase in the size of the Court, but another possible result 
would be the shifting of one or more justices to a more 
progressive outlook, though such a shift seems unlikely, as 
mentioned above.104 Either way, the Court would be forced to 
bend to the political realities: If and when the Democrats 
electorally sweep Congress and the presidency, the Court 
will need to bend to Democratic political power. That 
necessity, that reality, is baked into the checks and balances 
of our tripartite national government. And history amply 
illustrates the operation of those constitutional grants of 
power to Congress and the president in the nomination and 
confirmation processes as well as in setting the size of the 
Court.105 
The final reason not to reject court-packing for fear of 
public reaction paradoxically rests on a concern for the 
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public. If we are truly concerned with public opinion, we 
should be worried about the integrity of our democratic 
process—through which public opinion is most clearly 
expressed and manifested. Yet the conservative justices on 
the Roberts Court have consistently denigrated democratic 
government (while protecting wealth and the economic 
marketplace).106 Whether in relation to voting rights,107 
gerrymandering,108 respect for Congress’s representation of 
the people,109 or economic equality in political campaigns,110 
the Roberts Court has refused to bolster democracy. If we 
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must choose between protecting the Court (from court-
packing) and protecting democratic government (from the 
Roberts Court’s conservative decision making), the choice is 
clear. We must preserve and enhance democracy. If the 
Court demonstrates hostility toward democratic 
government, then it is the Court that must be sacrificed.111 
But in reality, the Court need not be sacrificed. To the 
degree that Levitsky and Ziblatt argue, in How Democracies 
Die, that court-packing is necessarily a tool of autocrats that 
will undermine our democratic norms, they overstate their 
case. Unquestionably, Court-packing can be useful for an 
autocrat, but court-packing alone does not transform a duly 
elected president into an autocrat. If Joe Biden were to 
become president and the Democrats were to pack the Court, 
Biden would not instantly become an autocrat. It would 
depend on the functioning of the Court as well as Biden’s 
other actions.112 And even after court-packing, the Court 
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should continue to decide cases as it has always done, in 
accord with a law-politics dynamic, as discussed in the 
introduction. A thirteen-justice Court should be, in this 
regard, no different than a nine-justice Court. The justices 
should continue to sincerely interpret the relevant legal texts 
(with politics writ small working in the background). In the 
end, Levitsky and Ziblatt fail to account for situations where 
a high court, such as the United States Supreme Court, itself 
threatens democratic government. The relationship between 
court-packing and democracy necessarily turns on the 
specific factual circumstances surrounding the court-packing 
and the subsequent actions of the reconstituted court. In 
1937, when political pressure, whether from FDR’s court-
packing plan or otherwise, induced the Court to shift its 
jurisprudential position, FDR and the New Dealers did not 
seek to undermine democratic government.113 To the 
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contrary, they sought to have the Court accept democracy 
and the legislative outcomes of the democratic process.114 
Given this, if Congress had enacted FDR’s plan, he would not 
have instantly been transformed from a popularly-elected 
president into an autocrat.115 
III. CONCLUSION 
In the current political climate, many progressives want 
to change the Supreme Court. Straightforward court-
packing has many advantages over other proposed changes, 
including court-curbing measures, impositions of term 
limits, and stylized expansions. Yet, many observers fear 
court-packing as the most extreme of the possible changes 
and, as such, the most likely to undermine the Court’s 
sociological legitimacy—the public support for the Court as a 
judicial institution. Yet, recent political science research 
shows that, empirically, the American people’s diffuse 
support for the Court is resilient. In fact, this positivity bias 
protects the Court sufficiently so that court-packing is 
unlikely to threaten this support to any serious degree. 
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Is this entire discussion of court-packing moot, however, 
because the Democratic nominee, Joe Biden, has already 
opposed court-packing?116 In other words, even if the 
moderate Biden is elected and becomes president in January 
2021—and the Democrats gain control of both houses of 
Congress—is the possibility of court-packing already dead 
because of Biden’s opposition? No, for three reasons. First, 
Democrats in Congress might pass a court-packing bill, and 
Biden, when confronted with the bill, might acquiesce to the 
wishes of his party. Second, and related to the first point, 
Biden’s vice president (and other advisers) might persuade 
Biden to change his position and support court-packing. 
Finally, if (or when) the Roberts Court, as currently 
constituted, starts invalidating Democratic statutes passed 
under Biden’s watch, the Court itself might provoke him to 
recognize the need for court-packing. Biden’s campaign 
statements have suggested a willingness to shift in more 
progressive directions when necessary or useful, so he might 
ultimately be persuaded to accept or even advocate for court-
packing, especially when he realizes that it will not weaken 
the Court’s public legitimacy.117 
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